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Abstract
A recently introduced concept of cooperative equilibrium [7], based on the assumption that players
have a natural attitude to cooperation, has been proven a powerful tool in predicting human behaviour
in social dilemmas. In this paper, we extend this idea to more general game models, termed Pareto
solvable games, which in particular include the Nash Bargaining Problem and the Ultimatum Game.
We show that games in this class possess a unique pure cooperative equilibrium. Furthermore, for
the Ultimatum Game, this notion appears to be strongly correlated with a suitably defined variant
of the Dictator Game. We support this observation with the results of a behavioural experiment
conducted using Amazon Mechanical Turk, which demonstrates that our approach allows for making
statistically precise predictions of average behaviour in such settings.
1 Introduction
Over recent decades, numerous experimental studies of human behaviour in economic scenarios have
demonstrated the implausibility of traditional game-theoretic solutions based on payoff maximisation,
rational choice and equilibria [6]. One of the most influential examples in experimental economics,
offering evidence against such rationally self-interested play, is the Ultimatum Game [23].1 In this model,
one player proposes a division of a given budget, b, between himself and the other player, who can either
accept or reject the proposal. If the recipient accepts, the budget is split accordingly; if he rejects, both
players get nothing.
Clearly, if the recipient is a payoff maximiser, he would accept any non-zero offer, so the proposer
should offer the smallest amount possible. However, as experimental results show (see, e.g., [23, 29,
6, 31, 43, 46, 41, 44]), human subjects tend to deviate from this equilibrium behaviour. Specifically,
the recipients often reject low offers, and the proposers often propose higher shares. While there is a
considerable quantitative variation across studies, the following regularities can be observed:
I. There are virtually no offers above 0.5b, where b denotes the given budget [19].
II. The vast majority of the offers lie in the interval [0.3b, 0.5b] [40].
III. There are almost no offers below 0.2b [19, 40].
IV. Offers below 0.25b are rejected with high probability [18].
These results inspired several attempts to develop suitable models to explain human behaviour more
accurately. Some were based on strategic arguments along the idea that higher offers are more likely
to be accepted [41, 44]; others used the so-called “inequity aversion” model, postulating that people are
averse to unfair situations and so propose a fairer budget split [19, 25, 32]. In this line, the classical
Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion model [19] is relatively successful in explaining the regularities I–IV.
However, the parameter estimation method in this model (involving two parameters for each of the
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1Other examples include the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Public Goods Game, and the Dictator Game (see, e.g., [6])
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players—see Appendix for more details) has come under serious criticism in the recent literature [2] due
to the difficulty of generalising this method to a wider set of economic games. Furthermore, the recently
proposed concept of “benevolence” (that is, making decisions towards increasing the opponent’s payoff
beyond one’s own) [11], has challenged the very idea of inequity aversion (see also [14, 16]). Alternatively,
Rand et al. [40] used stochastic evolutionary game theory to show that natural selection favours fairness.
However, while their model showed excellent results in matching population averages, there was a wider
variance in individual strategies than is normally present in empirical data. In particular, their model
yields a large number of individuals who make and demand offers above 50 per cent of the budget [20].
Based on these findings, Camerer [6] suggested that human players in the Ultimatum Game are most
likely to be motivated by a combination of strategic incentives and inequity aversion. In this work, we
explore this idea and propose a solution concept that compounds these two factors. We note that, even
though Fehr and Schmidt [19] also based their model on a similar approach, our work differs from theirs
in a number of conceptual aspects, which in particular include the way we define the utility function.
Specifically, in our model the strategic component comes in the form of a tendency to maximise a utility
depending on the social welfare, while the inequity aversion component corresponds to a donation of
the player in a certain variant of the Dictator Game [29] that we associate with the given instance of
the Ultimatum Game. Both these behavioural tendencies have been reported by previous experimental
studies [27, 22, 33, 39, 10, 11, 18, 5, 3, 4, 13, 15, 21].
In more detail, our model builds on the concept of cooperative equilibrium, previously proposed for
two-player one-shot social dilemmas [7], iterated two-player social dilemmas [12], and n-player one-shot
highly symmetric social dilemmas [1, 9]. We extend the definition to more general game classes, which
we term here Pareto solvable games, due to their properties. These games in particular include the afore-
mentioned Ultimatum Game, as well as other fundamental models, such as the Nash Bargaining Problem
and the Coordination Game. We show that these games possess a unique cooperative equilibrium.
Importantly, cooperative equilibrium in the Ultimatum Game gives a solution that explicitly predicts
the regularities III and IV observed in previous experiments. Moreover, this solution determines a precise
correlation between a player’s behaviour in the Ultimatum Game and its corresponding variant of the
Dictator Game. Using this correlation, we can give an a posteriori explanation for regularities I and II.
Essentially, the idea behind the concept of cooperative equilibrium is to reduce the original game to
another game, called the induced game, which differs from the original game only in the set of allowed
strategy profiles. It turns out that in the game induced by the Ultimatum Game, the proposer can not
make proposals below some x% > 0 of the initial budget and the recipient can no longer reject. That is,
the induced game is exactly the variant of the Dictator Game where the recipient is initially endowed with
x% of the budget, and the proposer has to decide whether to make an additional donation to the recipient
from the remaining part of the budget. The parameter x represents the level of players’ cooperation and
their perception of money. Following similar techniques to those used in [7] to compute this parameter,
we obtain x = 25%. In other words, cooperative equilibrium predicts that, on average, the proposer’s
behaviour in the Ultimatum Game is equivalent to the dictator’s behaviour in the variant of the Dictator
Game where the dictator is given 75% of the original budget and the recipient has 25% of the budget.
That is, the offer in the Ultimatum Game should be equal to the donation in this variant of the Dictator
Game, augmented by 25% of the budget initially given to the recipient.
To test this prediction, we conducted a behavioural experiment via Amazon Mechanical Turk [35,
26, 38]. We recruited US subjects, who were randomly assigned to two different treatments. In the first
treatment, each participant was given a role of either the proposer or the recipient in the Ultimatum
Game with a stake of $0.40. The proposers were then asked to play the following variant of the Dictator
Game: they were given additional $0.30 (i.e., 75% of the budget in the Ultimatum Game) and paired
with another anonymous MTurk worker who was given only $0.10 (the remaining 25%). In the second
treatment, the games were played in the reversed order.
As our results demonstrate, cooperative equilibrium correctly predicts the majority of human be-
haviours in such settings. Specifically, we observed that about 80% of our experimental subjects followed
the cooperative equilibrium prediction. Interestingly, the remaining 20% of the subjects who deviated
from the prediction were those who behaved completely inconsistently in the two games: that is, they
chose to split the budget equally in the Ultimatum Game, but kept everything to themselves in the
Dictator Game. We note that this type of subject appears problematic for the inequity aversion models
as well, and we believe, deserves a separate consideration (see Section 6 for a thorough discussion).
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Finally, this paper adds to the experimental evidence for a positive correlation between proposals in
the Ultimatum Game and donations in the Dictator Game. To date, we are only aware of two published
experimental studies where participants played both of these games, and one of them [36] reported a
significant positive correlation between the strategies in the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game.2
In this context, our work contributes to formally explain such a correlation between the two games
through our newly defined concept of cooperative equilibrium for Pareto solvable games.
The paper unfolds as follows. We start with describing the games in consideration in Section 2.
Then, in Section 3, we define our model. In detail, we first formalise our notion of fairness and then
determine which strategies the players would consider feasible in this respect. We then proceed and
introduce the class of Pareto solvable games and formally define a cooperative equilibrium for these
games. Our theoretical results are presented in Section 4, where we compute cooperative equilibria
for the Ultimatum Game and the Nash Bargaining Problem. Specifically, we show that these games
are indeed Pareto solvable and have a unique cooperative equilibrium, in which both players play pure
strategies. Further, Section 5 presents the experiment we conducted to test our predictions about the
behaviour in the Ultimatum Game and its correlation with the behaviour in the Dictator Game. We
conclude with a discussion of our results and future directions in Section 6. Additionally, the Appendix
provides full instructions for our experimental subjects.
2 Preliminaries
We start with the definitions of games considered in this paper. Our interest in these game classes is
motivated by the two following reasons. First, they model situations of primary importance, such as
negotiation and coordination problems. Second, they provide empirical evidence of behaviours, which
are inconsistent with traditional game-theoretic solutions. In particular, the Ultimatum Game that we
use as our main example, has long been in the centre of attention in experimental economics.
Ultimatum Game (UG). In this game, the first player (the proposer) is endowed with a sum of
money (or, budget), b, and needs to propose how to divide this money between himself and the other player
(the recipient). That is, he chooses the amount p(b) ∈ [0, b] to propose to the recipient. The recipient
gets to decide whether to accept or reject the proposal. If he accepts, the money is split according to the
proposal: that is, the recipient gets p(b), and the proposer keeps the remaining b− p(b). If the recipient
rejects, both players end up with no money at all. We denote this game by UG(b).
Dictator Game (DG). In this game, similarly to the Ultimatum Game, the first player (the dictator)
determines how to split a budget b between himself and the second player. The second player (the
recipient) simply accepts the donation made by the dictator. Thus, the recipient’s role is entirely passive
and has no effect on the outcome of the game. We denote this game by DG(b).
For our study, it is also convenient to define a modified version of the Dictator Game, where the
recipient may have some initial budget, bR, and the dictator has to decide, how much (if at all) to donate
to the recipient from his own budget, bD, in addition to the recipient’s initial budget. Thus, the dictator
chooses a strategy d(bD, bR) ∈ [0, bD], and the recipient has no say. We denote this game by DG(bD, bR).
Nash Bargaining Problem (NBP). This is a two-player game used to model bargaining interac-
tions. In this game, two players demand a portion of a given budget, b. If the total amount requested by
the players is less than b, they both get their request. If the total request exceeds b, both get nothing.
Coordination Game (CG). In this game, each player has to select one of the two strategies, A or
B. Both players prefer any coordinated profile (A,A) or (B,B) to any uncoordinated profile, (A,B) or
(B,A). However, the players’ individual utilities from playing (A,A) or (B,B) may be different.
Note also, that (A,A) and (B,B) are pure strategy Nash equilibria. Now, any probability distribution
over these two equilibria is a correlated equilibrium, and the players have to decide which of the infinitely
many possible such equilibria should be played. If they disagree and choose different distributions, they
are likely to receive zero payoffs, while all bargaining solutions define correlated equilibria.
2In particular, [17] did not directly report any correlation between the strategies in the two games. However, upon our
request, one of the authors (Antonio Esp´ın) have confirmed that they also observe such a correlation
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3 Cooperative equilibrium for Pareto solvable games
In this section, we extend the definition of cooperative equilibrium to a larger class of single-shot n-player
games, which we term Pareto solvable. This class, in particular, contains the Ultimatum Game and the
Nash Bargaining Problem (and hence, the Coordination Game) as above.
Our key idea is that players would divide into coalitions and act cooperatively as long as they believe
that the resulting outcome of the game is “fair” to the members of each coalition. In Section 3.1, we
formalise our notion of fairness for a given coalition of players, and then determine which strategies the
players would consider feasible in this respect, given a particular coalition structure, that is, a partition of
players into coalitions. We then proceed and introduce the class of Pareto solvable games, and formally
define a cooperative equilibrium for these games in Section 3.2.
3.1 Undominated fair strategies and games generated by coalition structures
Let G = (N, (Si, pii)i∈N ) be a normal-form game with a set N of n players, and, for all i ∈ N , a finite set
of strategies Si and a monetary payoff function pii : S → R, where S = ×j∈NSj . For any given coalition
(i.e., a subset) of players C ⊆ N , we write SC = ×j∈CSj for the set of strategy profiles restricted to C,
and we use −C to denote its complement, N \ C. Similarly, for a single player i, we use −i for the set
N \ {i} of all players but i.
We denote by ∆(X) the set of probability distributions on a finite set X. Thus, ∆(Si) defines the set
of mixed strategies for player i ∈ N , and his expected payoff from a mixed strategy profile σ is given by
pii(σ) =
∑
s∈S pii(s)σ1(s1) · . . . · σn(sn), where s = (s1, . . . , sn).
Note that while the function pii defines a monetary payoff of player i in game G, different players may
have different perceptions of the same amount of money they gain from the game. Formally, we express
this idea using an aggravation function Aggi(x, y), defined for x ≥ y, which represents the aggravation
that player i experiences when renouncing a monetary payoff of x and receiving a monetary payoff of y.
We assume the following:
• Aggi(x, y) is nonnegative:
– Aggi(x, y) ≥ 0, for all x ≥ y, and
– Aggi(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y;
• Aggi(x, y) is continuous;
• Aggi(x, y) is strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in y.
Example 3.1. An intuitive example of an aggravation function is given by Aggi(x, y) = ui(x) − ui(y),
where ui(k) stands for the utility of player i from getting a monetary payoff of k. It is often assumed
(see [30], p. 278) that ui is concave for positive payoffs (gains) and convex for negative payoffs (losses).
That is, the same increase in the gains is perceived more significant for small amounts and less significant
as the gains grow, and the other way around for the losses. In low-stake experiments, however, this effect
is likely to be negligible, so one may find the simple aggravation function Aggi(x, y) = x− y practically
useful, since it is parameter-free and easy to compute.
Now, let p = (p1, . . . , pk) denote a partition of the player set N , defining a possible coalition structure
that the players can form in G. We denote the set of all possible partitions of N by P(N). Each element
pα of this partition is interpreted as a coalition: that is, the players in the same pα play together. It is
natural to expect that the players in a coalition pα would only accept those outcomes, which pay the
members of the coalition in a fair way (at the very least). With the aggravation functions as above, we
define a notion of fairness as follows.
Let pα be a coalition in the coalition structure p and s be a profile of pure strategies. Let Wpα(s) =∑
i∈pα pii(s) denote the social welfare of coalition pα, and set:
Mpα(s) = max
i∈pα
Aggi(Wpα(s), pii(s)), (1)
mpα(s) = min
i∈pα
Aggi(Wpα(s), pii(s)). (2)
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That is, Mpα(s) (resp., mpα(s)) denotes the maximum (resp., the minimum) aggravation that a player in
coalition pα has from getting his share of payoff, pii(s), compared to the total coalitional payoff, Wpα(s).
Intuitively, the smaller the difference between Mpα(s) and mpα(s), the more fair the distribution of payoffs
among the coalition members. Hence, we make the following definition.
Definition 3.2. A profile of pure strategies s is said to be fair for a given coalition pα ∈ p, if it minimises
the difference
Mpα(s)−mpα(s). (3)
Obviously, there may be multiple fair profiles of strategies, resulting in different individual payoffs to
the members of a coalition (cf. Example 3.5). We order the set of fair strategies using the super-dominance
relation, introduced independently in [8] and [24].
Definition 3.3. A profile of pure strategies s′pα ∈ Spα for coalition pα super-dominates a profile spα ∈
Spα , if for all s−pα , s
′
−pα ∈ S−pα one has pii(s′pα , s′−pα) > pii(spα , s−pα), ∀i ∈ pα.
In words, a strategy is super-dominated by another strategy if the largest payoff that can be obtained
by playing the former strategy is strictly smaller than the smallest payoff that can be obtained by playing
the latter.
Now, let Fair(G, pα) be the set of pure strategies that are fair for coalition pα and let Max(Fair(G, pα))
contain its maximal elements w.r.t. the partial order induced by the super-dominance relation3. These
will be named undominated fair strategies for coalition pα.
Given this, we next say that a coalition structure p generates a new game, Gp, where players within
each coalition pα ∈ p cooperate to maximise their total payoff, playing fair, undominated strategies.
Formally,
Definition 3.4. Given a game G and a coalition structure p over N , let Gp be the game generated by p
as follows. The player set in Gp corresponds to the set of coalitions pα ∈ p, for each of which its set of
mixed strategies is given by the closure of the convex hull of Max(Fair(G, pα)) and the payoffs are defined
as the sums of payoffs of the members of pα.
Let ps denote what we call the (fully) selfish coalition structure where each player acts individually—
i.e., ps = ({1}, . . . , {n}). Since every strategy is fair in such a structure, the game Gp is then obtained from
G by simply deleting all super-dominated strategies. In general, however, Gp may appear very different
from G and, importantly, it need not be the game generated by the strategies that maximise the total
welfare. In particular, this may happen for the (fully) cooperative coalition structure pc = (N) where all
the players act collectively, forming the grand coalition, N = {1, . . . , n}. See the following Example 3.5
for illustration.
Example 3.5. Let G be the following variant of the Prisoner’s dilemma:
C D
C 10, 10 1, 20
D 20, 1 2, 2
Assume that players have the same perception of money, which we denote Agg. Since Agg is strictly
decreasing in the variable y, one can easily verify that for the cooperative coalition structure pc = ({1, 2}),
the only fair strategies are (C,C) and (D,D). Indeed,
M{1,2}(C,D)−m{1,2}(C,D) = M{1,2}(D,C)−m{1,2}(D,C) = Agg(21, 1)−Agg(21, 20) > 0,
while
M{1,2}(C,C)−m{1,2}(C,C) = Agg(20, 10)−Agg(20, 10)
= M{1,2}(D,D)−m{1,2}(D,D) = Agg(4, 2)−Agg(4, 2) = 0.
Now, note that (D,D) is super-dominated by (C,C), which is then the only maximal fair strategy, and
hence, Gpc is a one-player, one-strategy game. Yet, the only strategy (i.e., (C,C)) admissible in this game
does not maximise the social welfare.
3Since strategy sets are finite, Fair(G, pα) always has a maximal element. Moreover, for the Ultimatum Game and the
Bargaining problem, we will show that Fair(G, pα) is always a singleton, thus implying Max(Fair(G, pα)) = Fair(G, pα). For
these games the assumption of the strategy sets’ finiteness can then be removed and, in fact, for technical convenience, we
will assume these sets are continuous.
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3.2 Pareto solvable games and cooperative equilibrium
Having defined the games generated by coalition structures, we now use them to formalise our extended
notion of cooperative equilibrium. For simplicity of exposition, we restrict the definition to the case of
two-player games, which in particular contain the Ultimatum Game and the Bargaining problem, which
are the focus of this paper. We later discuss how this definition generalises to games with n players.
Consider a two-player game G and fix a coalition structure p. For the game Gp generated by p, let
Nash(Gp) denote the set of its mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We then say that player i plays according
to the coalition structure p, if he plays his corresponding marginal strategy σi of some Nash equilibrium
profile σ ∈ Nash(Gp), given that other players play σ−i. We say that player i deviates from p if he applies
a unilateral profitable deviation from an equilibrium profile σ ∈ Nash(Gp)—that is, he plays a strategy
σ′i against σ−i, for some σ ∈ Nash(Gp), such that pii(σ′i, σ−i) > pii(σ). Note that while no player can
deviate from the selfish coalition structure ps = ({1}, {2}) by definition, deviations may be applied from
the cooperative structure pc = ({1, 2}).
Given a coalition structure p, a player i and a subset D ⊆ N \ {i} of other players, let τ iD(p) ∈ [0, 1]
denote the subjective probability that player i assigns to the event that the set of players D deviates
from p for the sake of their individual interests, knowing that player i plays according to the coalition
structure p. In a two-player game, we only have D = −i or D = ∅, and so τ i−i(p) = 1 − τ i∅(p). In [7],
the probabilities τ iD(p) were computed directly using equation (7) below. However, in light of the more
recent developments, where these probabilities have been used to show the consistency of the cooperative
equilibrium theory with the Social Heuristics Hypothesis [37] or predicting human behaviour in iterated
social dilemmas [12], here we prefer to treat them as parameters, so that the following properties hold:
(A1) If player −i has no profitable deviation from any σ ∈ Nash(Gp), then τ i−i(p) = 0;
(A2) If for all σ ∈ Nash(Gp) and for all deviations σ′−i of player −i from σ there is a strategy σ′i such
that pi−i(σ′i, σ
′
−i) < pi−i(σ), then τ
i
D(p) < 1.
That is, if there is no incentive for a player to deviate from any equilibrium profile under a given coalition
structure, then the probability of deviating from the structure is zero; and, if deviating from a coalition
structure may lead to an eventual loss, then the probability of deviating is less than 1. In particular, (A1)
implies that τ i−i(ps) = 0, since the sets of Nash equilibria of G and Gps coincide, and hence no unilateral
deviations are profitable.
Now, let ei∅(p) be the minimal payoff that player i can get if nobody abandons the coalition structure
p (i.e., ei∅(p) = minσ∈Nash(Gp) pii(σ)), and let e
i
−i(p) be the minimal payoff of player i when he plays
according to some Nash equilibrium of Gp and −i deviates from that equilibrium profile. We define the
value of a coalition structure p for player i as an expected value of these minimal payoffs, that is,
vi(p) = e
i
∅(p)τ
i
∅(p) + e
i
−i(p)τ
i
−i(p). (4)
In what follows, we consider a game G as a tuple (N, (Si, pii)i∈N , τ iD(p)i∈N,D⊆N\{i},p∈P(N)), where
(N, (Si, pii)i∈N ) corresponds to the original strategic game form and τ iD(p) ∈ [0, 1] are given parame-
ters satisfying the properties (A1) and (A2).
With this notation, we now define the class of Pareto solvable games, as follows.
Definition 3.6. A two-player game G is called Pareto solvable if there exists a coalition structure p∗
that maximises the values v1(p) and v2(p) for both players at once.
The class of Pareto solvable games is quite large. Indeed, under the assumption of the deviation
probability parameters τ iD(p) being symmetric (that is, τ
1
2 (p) = τ
2
1 (p) for p = ps, pc), which is implied, in
particular, by the formulas for their computation proposed in [7] and [12], it clearly contains all major
two-player social dilemmas, such as the Prisoner’s dilemma, the Traveler’s dilemma and the Bertrand
competition. Moreover, regardless of the exact values of τ iD(p)’s, as long as they satisfy the properties
(A1) and (A2), it also includes the Ultimatum Game and the Nash Bargaining Problem (and hence, the
Coordination game), as we demostrate in Section 4 below.
For these games, we now define the notion of cooperative equilibrium. We use the values vi(p
∗) to
represent the players’ beliefs about the payoffs they expect to obtain in the game. In other words, these
values make a tacit binding among the players, such that they only play those strategies that garantee
them payoffs of at least vi(p
∗).
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Definition 3.7. Let G be a Pareto solvable game and p∗ a coalition structure that maximises the values
vi(p) for both players. The induced game Ind(G, p∗) is the restriction of G where the set of (mixed)
strategies is reduced to include only those profiles σ ∈ ×i∈N∆(Si), for which pii(σ) ≥ vi(p∗) for all i ∈ N .
Finally, since the set of strategy profiles in the induced game is non-empty, convex and compact, it
possesses a Nash equilibrium, and we can make the following definition.
Definition 3.8. A cooperative equilibrium of a Pareto solvable game G is defined as a Nash equilibrium
of the induced game Ind(G, p∗).
Remark 3.9. For the sake of simplicity, we have defined the cooperative equilibrium only for two-player
Pareto solvable games. The extension to n-player games is straightforward. For example, the value for
player i of a coalition structure p will be defined as
vi(p) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
eiC(p)τ
i
C(p),
where τ iC(p) is the subjective probability that player i assigns to the event that players in C abandon the
coalition structure p and eiC(p) is the minimum payoff that player i would get if he plays according to the
coalition structure p and players in C abandon it. Given this definition, one may define n-player Pareto
solvable games as those games for which there is a coalition structure p∗ such that vi(p) is maximised,
for all i = 1, . . . , n. In a similar fashion, all other definitions extend to n player games.
4 Cooperative equilibria of Ultimatum Games and Nash Bar-
gaining Problems
In this section, we compute cooperative equilibria for some important subclasses of Pareto solvable games:
namely, for the Ultimatum Game and the Nash Bargaining Problem. Specifically, we demonstrate that
these games are indeed Pareto solvable and have a unique cooperative equilibrium in pure strategies.
4.1 Purifiable games
The existence of a pure strategy cooperative equilibrium is due to the fact that the induced games of UG
and NBP are what we term purifiable, in the sense that for every mixed strategy σi of any player i, there
exists a pure strategy si, which is a profitable deviation from σi, whichever strategy σ−i is played by the
other player(s). Formally,
Definition 4.1. A game G is called purifiable if for each player i ∈ N and any mixed strategy σi ∈ ∆(Si),
there is a pure strategy si ∈ Si such that pii(si, σ−i) ≥ pii(σi, σ−i), for all σ−i ∈ ×j 6=i∆(Sj).
For such games, it then suffices to consider only pure strategies. Now, in both the UG and the NBP
models, the two players share a unit of payoff (i.e., we normalise the budget b to be equal to 1) between
them – that is, the total sum of the players’ payoffs is always 1. As the following Lemma 4.2 shows, there
is then only one way to share the payoffs so that the players have equal aggravations.
Lemma 4.2. Let Aggi(x, y) be the aggravation function of player i = 1, 2 in game G. Then, the equation
Agg1(1, 1− x) = Agg2(1, x), with x ∈ [0, 1], has a unique solution x∗. Moreover, x∗ 6= 0, 1.
Proof. The proof is straightforward. Let f1(x) = Agg1(1, 1− x) and f2(x) = Agg2(1, x). Then,
• f1(x) is a strictly increasing continuous function with f1(0) = 0 and f1(1) > 0; and
• f2(x) is a strictly decreasing continuous function with f2(0) > 0 and f2(1) = 0.
Hence, there is a unique point x∗ where f1(x∗) = f2(x∗), and x∗ 6= 0, 1. 
We now use Lemma 4.2 to describe cooperative equilibria of the Ultimatum Game and the Nash
Bargaining Problem, as follows.
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4.2 Ultimatum Games
Theorem 4.3. Let G be the Ultimatum Game with players P (the proposer) and R (the recipient), and
budget b. Let x∗ be the solution to AggP (1, 1− x) = AggR(1, x). Then,
• G is Pareto solvable, where the values for both players are maximised by the cooperative coalition
structure pc and equal:
vP (pc) = b (1− x∗) and vR(pc) = bx∗τR∅ (pc).
• The induced game Ind(G, pc) is purifiable, and its purification coincides with the variant of the
Dictator Game with parameters bD = b
(
1− x∗τR∅ (pc)
)
and bR = bx
∗τR∅ (pc), where the proposer
plays the role of a dictator and donates to the recipient the amount of at most bx∗τRP (pc).
Proof. First, observe that the game generated by the selfish coalition structure ps = ({P}, {R}) coincides
with the original game (i.e., Gps = G), as there are no super-dominated strategies. Now, while this game
may have different Nash equilibria, the lowest payoff for both players is obtained at the equilibrium profile
(0, R) where the proposer makes an offer of 0 to the recipient, and the recipient rejects. In this case, both
players get nothing, and since by (A1) the probability of deviation from ps is 0 for both players, they
both have a zero value for the selfish coalition structure ps. Thus, vP (ps) = vR(ps) = 0.
For the cooperative coalition structure, pc = ({P,R}), we now demonstrate that its generated game
Gpc only allows a single strategy profile (bx∗, A), where the proposer makes an offer of bx∗ and the
recipient accepts. To this end, we only need to show that, for all x ∈ [0, 1] such that x 6= x∗, one has
M{P,R}(bx∗, A)−m{P,R}(bx∗, A) < M{P,R}(bx,A)−m{P,R}(bx,A). (5)
But this is straightforward from the definition of x∗ as the unique solution for
M{P,R}(bx,A)−m{P,R}(bx,A) = b |AggP (1, 1− x)−AggR(1, x)| = 0.
implying that the left-hand side of inequality (5) equals zero, and the right-hand side is strictly positive.
Now, if the proposer is assumed to make an offer of bx∗ > 0, then it is not beneficial for the recipient
to deviate from accepting the offer, and hence, by (A1), τP∅ (pc) = 1. Thereby, since e
P
∅ (pc) = b(1− x∗),
we have vP (pc) = b(1− x∗) > 0.
On the other hand, if it is believed that the recipient will accept, then the proposer has an incentive
to deviate and make a smaller offer. In the worst case for the recipient, the proposer offers him zero, so
eRP (pc) = 0. We thus get vR(pc) = bx
∗τR∅ (pc). Finally, by (A2), we have that τ
R
∅ (pc) > 0, which, coupled
with bx∗ > 0, yields vR(pc) > 0.
Hence, the cooperative coalition structure pc maximises the values for both players, so the Ultimatum
Game is Pareto solvable.
We now turn to prove the second part of the theorem, stating that the induced game Ind(G, pc) is
purifiable. To avoid unnecessary technical complications, we only consider finitely supported strategies
for the proposer, even if his strategy set is given by the continuous interval [0, b]. That is, we assume
that any proposer’s mixed strategy σP is given by a finite sequence of coefficients
(
λ(1), . . . , λ(K)
)
, for
some K ∈ N, such that λ(k) > 0 represents the probability of playing a pure strategy s(k) ∈ [0, b]. Hence,∑K
k=1 λ(k) = 1, and w.l.o.g. we assume that the strategies s(k) are ordered in ascending order.
We next demonstrate that any such mixed strategy σP can be replaced by the pure strategy s(1).
Indeed, for any mixed strategy σR = (λ, 1− λ) of the recipient, with λ being the probability of sR = A
(accept), we get
piP (σP , σR) = λ
(
λ(1)(b− s(1)) + . . .+ λ(K)(b− s(K))
)
< λ(b− s(1))(λ(1) + . . .+ λ(K))
= λ(b− s(1)) = piP (s(1), σR).
Similarly, any mixed strategy σR = (λ, 1− λ) of the recipient, where λ < 1, can be replaced by the pure
strategy sR = A, as for any strategy σP of the proposer we have
piR(σP , σR) = λ
(
λ(1)s(1) + . . .+ λ(K)s(K)
)
< λ(1)s(1) + . . .+ λ(K)s(K)
= piR(σR, A).
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Finally, in the purification of the induced game Ind(G, pc), the proposer makes an offer of at least vR(pc) =
bx∗τR∅ (pc), but of at most b − vP (pc) = bx∗, and the recipient must accept. The game then coincides
with the variant of the Dictator Game with parameters bP = b
(
1− x∗τR∅ (pc)
) ≥ b (1− x∗) and bR =
bx∗τR∅ (pc), where the donation that the dictator can make to the recipient does not exceed
bP − vP (pc) = b
(
1− x∗τR∅ (pc)− (1− x∗)
)
= bx∗(1− τR∅ (pc)) = bx∗τRP (pc).
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.3 implies that the Ultimatum Game has a unique pure strategy cooperative equilibrium,
in which the proposer makes an offer of x∗τR∅ (pc), and the recipient accepts. Moreover, since the induced
game of UG essentially coincides with a corresponding variant of the Dictator Game, the cooperative
equilibrium predicts a correlation between these two games. Specifically, the theorem suggests that
Corollary 4.4. In a Ultimatum Game G, the proposer makes an offer of
bx∗τR∅ (pc) + d
(
b
(
1− x∗τR∅ (pc)
)
, bx∗τR∅ (pc)
)
, (6)
where d
(
b
(
1− x∗τR∅ (pc)
)
, bx∗τR∅ (pc)
)
is the donation that the proposer would make to the recipient if he
were to act as the dictator in DG(bP , bR) with parameters bP = b
(
1− x∗τR∅ (pc)
)
and bR = bx
∗τR∅ (pc),
and we expect that d
(
b
(
1− x∗τR∅ (pc)
)
, bx∗τR∅ (pc)
) ≤ bx∗τRP (pc).
Now, in order to obtain testable predictions of players’ behaviour, we need to evaluate the parameters
x∗ and τ iD(p). As it is often in experiments with anonymous participants, the average experimental
subjects may overgeneralise their experience and expect their opponents to have the same perception
of money as they do, so, in order to make predictions of average behaviour in anonymous games, we
assume that all players have the same aggravation function. That is, for any two subjects i and j, we
have Aggi(x, y) = Aggj(x, y). Applying this assumption in Lemma 4.2, we get x
∗ = 0.5, which allows us
to make the following individual level predictions:
• Local prediction. In a UG experiment with anonymous players, most proposers will offer to their
opponents a payment of b · 0.5τR∅ (pc) + d
(
b
(
1− 0.5τR∅ (pc)
)
, b · 0.5τR∅ (pc)
)
.
To estimate the probabilities of deviation from a given coalition structure, we adopt the idea from [7].
Specifically, these probabilities depend on the incentive for each player to abandon a coalition structure,
and his possible loss from doing so. Here, we define the incentive, I−i(p), for a player −i ∈ N to abandon
the coalition structure p, as the aggravation in renouncing to the maximal possible gain that −i can
obtain by leaving the coalition structure p, while his opponent (player i) plays according to p:
I−i(p) = sup
{
Agg−i
(
pi−i(σ
p
i , σ−i), pi−i(σ
p
i , σ
p
−i)
)
: σp ∈ Nash(Gp), σ−i ∈ ∆(S−i)
}
However, player i may also deviate from p (whether he anticipates player −i’s deviation or not), thus
yielding a loss for player −i. We define such a loss, L−i(p), of a player −i when he leaves a coalition
structure p in order to maximise his payoff as the maximal aggravation that he may experience, while
player i also may deviate from the coalition structure p (either following his selfish interests or anticipating
player −i’s deviation). Formally,
L−i(p) = sup
{
Agg−i
(
pi−i(σi, σ−i), pi−i(σ
p
i , σ
p
−i)
)
:
σp ∈ Nash(Gp), σ−i ∈ argmax∆(S−i) pi−i(σ
p
i , σ−i), σi ∈ ∆(Si)
s.t. pii(σi, σ
p
−i) > pii(σ
p
i , σ
p
−i) or pii(σi, σ−i) > pii(σ
p
i , σ−i)
}
That is, for each σp ∈ Nash(Gp), mixed strategy σ−i maximises the payoff of player −i from (σpi , σ−i),
and σi runs over the set of i-deviations from either (σ
p
i , σ
p
−i) or (σ
p
i , σ−i).
Given this, we finally set:
τ i−i(p) =
I−i(p)
I−i(p) + L−i(p)
(7)
As we previously mentioned in Example 3.1, in a low-stake experiment, function Aggi(x, y) = x − y
appears a good approximation of the real players’ aggravation. For such a function, it is immediate that
I−i(pc) = x∗ = 0.5 and L−i(pc) = 1− x∗ = 0.5. We therefore can make the following prediction:
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• Global prediction. In a UG experiment with anonymous players and low stakes, it is expected
that the average offer is composed of 25% of the total endowment, b, and the average donation in
DG(0.75b, 0.25b).
We test these predictions experimentally in Section 5. We conclude the section with presenting analogous
results for the Nash Bargaining Problem.
4.3 Nash Bargaining Problem
Consider the classical Nash Bargaining Problem, where two players bargain on how to share b units of
surplus, where they get their claims satisfied if and only if these claims are feasible, that is, they sum up
to less than or equal to b. Then,
Theorem 4.5. In the only pure cooperative equilibrium of the Nash Bargaining Problem, one player asks
for bx∗ and the other player claims b (1− x∗).
The proof of Theorem 4.5 follows similar lines to the proof of Theorem 4.3, and hence is omitted.
Finally, since for players with the same perception of money we have x∗ = 0.5, this yields the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.6. If the players have the same perception of money, then in the unique cooperative equi-
librium of the Nash Bargaining Problem, each player asks for exactly half of the endowment.
5 Behavioural experiment investigating the correlation between
Ultimatum Game and Dictator Game
In this section, we report on the experiment we conducted to test the correlation between the UG offers
and the DG donations as our model predicts. We start with the outline of the experiment, and then
discuss the results we obtained.
5.1 Design
We recruited US subjects (a.k.a. workers) via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) [35, 26, 38]. As is
common in experiments with human participants (either online or in physical laboratories), AMT workers
receive a baseline payment for participation and can also earn an additional bonus that depends on how
they perform in the game. The main advantage of the AMT experiments is in that they are easily
implementable and relatively inexpensive, compared to laboratory experiments. Nevertheless, it has been
shown that data gathered using AMT agree both qualitatively and quantitatively with data collected in
physical labs [26, 38, 42].
However, when planning such an experiment, one should be aware of the fact that AMT workers may
try to play the same game multiple times in order to get a larger bonus and/or select random strategies in
order to minimise the time spent on completing the task. To control for these issues, we used Qualtrics—a
survey builder that allowed us to exclude those workers who have already participated in the experiment
(by checking their AMT ID and their IP address) or those who failed to answer the comprehension
questions that we designed for each part of the task to make sure that the workers understand the task
and would make sensible decisions.
The task that the workers had to perform in the experiment consisted of two parts: play a given role
in the Ultimatum Game and in the Dictator Game. The experiment contained two treatments, differing
in the order in which the UG and the DG were played. In both treatments, subjects earned $0.20 for
participating and received a bonus that was determined from their performance in the two games. In
more detail:
• Treatment 1. Subjects were randomly assigned a role of either the proposer/dictator or the recipient.
First, they played the UG as follows. The proposers were given a budget of $0.40 and asked how
much, if at all, they would offer to an anonymous recipient they have been randomly paired with,
while the recipient may either accept or reject the offer. Responders, at the same time, were asked
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Figure 1: Scatter plot of the players’ choices in the two treatments: UG played after DG (a) and DG
played after UG (b), after filtering the players with 0c donation in DG and an equal split offer in UG.
to declare their minimal acceptable offer.
Second, the DG was played. The proposers (playing now the role of a dictator) were notified that
they have been assigned another anonymous worker to interact with. They were given another
$0.30 and informed that their current partner is endowed with only $0.10. Then they were asked
how much, if at all, they would donate to the other participant, who has no say and can only accept
their offer.
• Treatment 2. As above, but playing the DG first and the UG second.
In both games, we restricted the set of possible strategies to multiples of 2 cents, within the given
budget. Thus, a proposer in the Ultimatum Game could only make an offer of {0, 2, 4, . . . , 40} cents. Full
instructions for participants are presented in the Appendix.
5.2 Results
The results for Treatment 1 are summarised in Table 1 and Table 2. We had 172 subjects that played as
proposers in the Ultimatum Game and as dictators in the Dictator Game.
In detail, the mean offer in the UG was 18.18c, which constitutes 45% of the budget. More than half
of the subjects (about 65%) offered the equal split, which was also the modal and the median offer. Only
one subject acted consistently with the subgame perfect equilibrium for payoff-maximising preferences,
which is to offer the recipient nothing at all. We note that these results appear consistent with those
reported in other studies [28, 6, 34].
In the DG, the mean offer was 5.40c. The distribution of donations was essentially bimodal: 42% of
the subjects decided to act selfishly and make no donation at all, while 40% of the participants acted
so as to minimise inequity and donate 10c. These results are qualitatively similar to those presented in
previous studies, although in previous reports the selfish behaviour was observed significantly more often
than the inequity averse behaviour [15]. This difference may appear related to the framing effect caused
by the fact that the DG was played after the UG in this treatment. However, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that donations in Treatment 1 and Treatment 2 (differing by the order of the UG and DG)
are actually the same. In fact, we ran the non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-sum test, i.e., the standard
hypothesis test for data samples that cannot assumed to be normally distributed like our case [45], and
the returned significance value is P = 0.1969, which does not reject the null hypothesis.
In contrast, we find a significant positive correlation between the UG offers and the DG donations
(Spearman’s ρ rank correlation test: ρ = 0.3412, P < .0001). In particular, we observe that 43% of the
subjects played exactly according to our global prediction based on the cooperative equilibrium:
p(40) = d(30, 10) + 10 (8)
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That is, their offer in the Ultimatum Game with b = 40c was composed of their donation in the Dictator
Game with parameters bD = 0.75b = 30 and bR = 0.25b = 10, and additional 10c (i.e., 25% of the total
endowment in the UG).
We test the quality of this prediction by fitting the following linear equation:
p(40) = cfitting(1)d(30, 10) + cfitting(0) (9)
where the coefficients cfitting(0), cfitting(1) are estimated through least square error. This linear fit is also
showed in Figure 1a. We compare the coefficients with the coefficients cmodel(0) and cmodel(1) fitted by
our prediction model by computing their corresponding mean squared errors, MSEfitting and MSEmodel.
We find that cfitting(0) = 16.3912 and cfitting(1) = 0.3320, with the mean squared error MSEfitting =
17.6383, while the cooperative equilibrium model prescribes cmodel(0) = 10 and cmodel(1) = 1, resulting
in the mean squared error MSEmodel = 37.0467.
At first glance, our prediction may seem quite inaccurate, compared to the linear fitting. However, it
turns out that the difference in equations (8) and (9) is mainly due to a subset of 42 subjects (about 24%)
who demonstrated completely inconsistent behaviour in playing the two games—that is, they decided for
the equal split in the UG (offering the recipient 20c), but acted selfishly in the DG (donating 0c). Note
that this type of subjects is also very problematic for the inequity aversion models, as they act in an
inequity averse way in the UG and the opposite in the DG. We refer to Section 6 for a more detailed
discussion about this issue.
Taking out these 42 inconsistent subjects allows us to observe significantly stronger correlations.
When only consistent participants were taken into account, the mean UG offer was equal 17.60c and the
mean DG donation was 7.15c. The correlation between the UG offers and the DG donation also gets
much stronger (Spearman’s ρ rank correlation: ρ = 0.7136, P < .0001). Moreover, 57% of these subjects
played exactly according to equation (8)). Finally, the linear fitting now gives pfitting(0) = 12.5308,
pfitting(1) = 0.7086 and MSEfitting = 14.6281, which is much closer to the cooperative equilibrium model
with pmodel(0) = 10, pmodel(1) = 1 and MSEmodel = 16.7077. This trend is also shown by the scatter plot
of the players’ choices together with their linear fitting in Figure 1a.
Mean Offer Mean donation Correlation
All 18.18 5.40 0.3412∗∗∗
No (20,0) 17.60 7.15 0.7136∗∗∗
Table 1: Statistical analysis of Treatment 1. Spearman’s ρ rank correlation test. ∗∗∗ stands for P < .0001.
Linear fitting Model MSE fitting MSE model
All p(0) = 16.40, p(1) = 0.33 p(0) = 10, p(1) = 1 17.64 37.05
No (20,0) p(0) = 12.53, p(1) = 0.71 p(0) = 10, p(1) = 1 14.63 16.71
Table 2: Comparison between polynomial fitting model at degree n = 1 and predictions of the cooperative
equilibrium in Treatment 1.
The results for Treatment 2 are given in Tables 3 and 4. We had 198 subjects that played as dictators
in the Dictator Game and as proposers in the Ultimatum Game. The mean donation was 5.39c, while
the distribution of donations was essentially bimodal with half of the participants donating 0c and 37%
making the inequity minimising donation of 10c. While these distributions of donations seems to be more
left-weighted than the one we observed in Treatment 1, as we mentioned before, we cannot exclude the
null hypothesis that they are actually the same (Wilcoxon rank-sum: P = 0.1969). The mean UG offer
was 16.77c, that is 42% of the budget. Slightly more than half of the subjects (53%) chose the equal
split and ten subjects acted consistently with the subgame perfect equilibrium for payoff-maximising
preferences, which is to offer 0c or 2c.
Similarly to Treatment 1, we find a significant positive correlation between the UG offers and the
DG donations (Spearman’s ρ rank correlation: test: ρ = 0.3322, P < .0001). In this case, 38% of the
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subjects played exactly according to our global prediction stated in Equation (8). Again, we tested the
quality of a linear fitting (see Equation (9)). We obtained cfitting(0) = 14.2689 and cfitting(1) = 0.5079
and the mean squared error MSEfitting = 35.5953, while the cooperative equilibrium prediction gives
cmodel(0) = 0.10, cmodel(1) = 1 and the mean squared error MSEmodel = 40.7273.
Also in this case, the difference is mainly caused by the inconsistent behaviour of 42 subjects (21%)
who donated 0c in the DG and proposed the equal split in the UG. When only consistent participants
were considered, the mean UG offer was equal to 15.91c and the mean DG donation was 6.27c. The
correlation between the UG offers and the DG donation also gets much stronger (Spearman’s ρ rank
correlation: ρ = 0.6377, P < .0001). This correlation is also apparent in the scatter plot and linear
fitting in Figure 1b. Moreover, 49% of these subjects played exactly according to Equation (8), and the
polynomial fitting gave cfitting(0) = 10.9531, cfitting(1) = 0.7907 and MSEfitting = 23.1418, compared with
the cooperative equilibrium prediction with cmodel(0) = 10, cmodel(1) = 1 and MSEmodel = 24.7695.
Mean donation Mean offer Correlation
All 5.39 16.77 0.3322∗∗∗
No (0,20) 6.27 15.91 0.6377∗∗∗
Table 3: Statistical analysis of Treatment 2. Spearman’s ρ rank correlation test. ∗∗∗ stands for P < .0001.
Linear fitting Model MSE fitting MSE model
All p(0) = 14.27, p(1) = 0.51 p(0) = 10, p(1) = 1 35.60 40.73
No (0,20) p(0) = 10.95, p(1) = 0.79 p(0) = 10, p(1) = 1 23.14 24.77
Table 4: Comparison between polynomial fitting model at degree n = 1 and predictions of the cooperative
equilibrium in Treatment 2.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have extended the concept of cooperative equilibrium from two-player social dilemmas
to a more general class of games containing, as important instances, the Ultimatum Game and the Nash
Bargaining Problem. We used this concept to obtain theoretical predictions of human players’ behaviour
in these games. In particular, we derived a correlation between the offers that proposers make to recipients
in the UG and the donations they would make in the corresponding variant of the Dictator Game where
the proposer is endowed with 75% of the total budget, while the recipient has the remaining 25% upfront.
This correlation is particularly interesting because it can be tested in the laboratory.
Our model explicitly predicts the regularities III and IV outlined in Section 1. Specifically, it suggests
that on average, UG proposers would offer at least 25% of their budget to recipients, which is consistent
with the experimental findings showing that there are almost no offers below 0.2b (regularity III). Also
notice, that accepting less than 25% of the proposer’s budget is excluded from the set of feasible strategy
profiles in the game induced by the cooperative coalition structure, which is consistent with regularity IV,
stating that offers below 0.25b get rejected with high probability. Finally, the correlation we established
between the UG offers and the DG donations gives an a posteriori explanation of regularities I and II:
indeed, virtually every donation in the DG is bounded above by the equal split [15].
In order to test the predicted correlation between the offers in the UG and the donations in the DG,
we conducted an experiment via Amazon Mechanical Turk and found that about 80% of experimental
subjects played according to our prediction. As for the remaining 20%, we must point out that these
subjects seem to form a special class showing inconsistent behaviour in the two games: these subjects made
a zero donation in the Dictator Game, but offered half of the budget to the recipient in the Ultimatum
Game. Such behaviour appears problematic not only for our approach, but also for the standard inequity
aversion model introduced by Fehr and Schmidt [19]. This model assumes that player i’s utility from the
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allocation (xi, x−i) of monetary payoffs between himself and player −i, is given by:
ui(xi, x−i) = xi − αi max{x−i − xi, 0} − βi max{xi − x−i, 0} (10)
where 0 ≤ βi ≤ αi are individual parameters, representing the extent to which player i regrets being
worse off (parameter αi) or enjoys being better off (parameter βi) than the other player. By estimating
the joint distribution (α, β) of the parameters, the model gives 30% of players with (α, β) = (0, 0), 30%
of players with (α, β) = (0.5, 0.25), 30% with (α, β) = (1, 0.6), and 10% with (α, β) = (4, 0.6). However,
this distribution is not consistent with the aforementioned subjects choosing equal split of the budget in
the UG, but a zero donation in the DG. To see this, first observe that if a subject makes a zero donation
in the Dictator Game, then his parameter β must be smaller than 0.5. Indeed, a subject with β = 0.5
is indifferent to any donation and a subject with β > 0.5 would donate half of the endowment. Also
note that a person donating zero in the DG but splitting the budget equally in the UG cannot be of the
type with (α, β) = (0.5, 0.25), since then he would donate a half of his endowment also in the DG. It
follows that, according to the Fehr and Schmidt’s estimation of the parameters, the only possibility is
that such a person has the type with (α, β) = (0, 0). We further make the following few observations (see
the Appendix for the full proof):
1. Subjects of type (α, β) = (0, 0) who believe they are playing with subjects of type (α, β) = (0, 0),
would donate nothing in the DG and offer nothing in the UG.
2. Subjects of type (α, β) = (0, 0) who believe they are playing with subjects of type (α, β) =
(0.5, 0.25), would donate nothing in the DG and offer 10c in the UG.
3. Subjects of type (α, β) = (0, 0) who believe they are playing with subjects of type (α, β) = (2, 0.6),
would donate nothing in the DG and offer 16c in the UG.
4. Subjects of type (α, β) = (0, 0) who believe they are playing with subjects of type (α, β) = (4, 0.6),
would donate nothing in the DG and 17.78c in the UG.
Now, it is clear from the above that Fehr and Schmidt’s model does not account for the players offering
equal split in the UG and making a zero donation in the DG. The question is though who are these
subjects and why do they act in such an apparently inconsistent way? We note that, although their
behaviour deviates from our global prediction that is based on an explicit computation of the model
parameters, yet it is consistent with Theorem 4.3, corresponding to the case where τR∅ (pc) = 1 and both
the proposer and the recipient have the same perception of money. Recalling that τR∅ (pc) represents the
probability that the recipient assigns to the event that the proposer does not deviate from the cooperative
coalition structure, it follows that the cooperative equilibrium concept explains such subjects as more
cooperative than the average. Testing this (as we see it, non-trivial) hypothesis is an interesting direction
for future research.
There is also another interesting novel prediction provided by our cooperative equilibrium model.
Consider the situation where it is common knowledge that the proposer is much richer than the recipient.
This could be formalised by saying that the aggravation function of the proposer, for fixed y, increases
much slower than that of the recipient. Consequently, the intersection point x∗ found in Lemma 4.2
lies much closer to 1. Keeping τR,P (pc) constant, this implies that the prediction of the cooperative
equilibrium is that, in this situation, the proposer’s offer would be higher than the one he would make
if they were equally rich. Consequently, the cooperative equilibrium predicts that proposers offer more
to poor players than to equally rich players. Such a behaviour has been qualitatively observed in the
Dictator Game [4], but we are not aware of any study investigating it in the Ultimatum Game. In future
research, it would be interesting to test this prediction experimentally.
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Appendix
Technical details
According to Fehr and Schmidt’s model, the utility for player i when player i receives xi and player −i
receives x−i is:
ui(xi, x−i) = xi − αi max(x−i − xi, 0)− βi max(xi − x−i, 0), (11)
where 0 ≤ βi ≤ αi are individual parameters, representing the extent to which player i regrets to be
worse off (parameter αi) and better off (parameter βi) than the other player. We say that a player has
type (α, β) if he plays according to Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function with parameters α and β.
Proposition 6.1. Consider the Ultimatum Game where the proposer has a budget of 40c and the Dictator
Game where the dictator has a budget of 30c and the recipient already owns 10c. The following statements
hold:
1. If the proposer has type (α, β) = (0, 0) and believes he is playing with a recipient of type (α, β) =
(0, 0), than he would donate nothing in the DG and offer nothing in the UG.
2. If the proposer has type (α, β) = (0, 0) and believes he is playing with a recipient of type (α, β) =
(0.5, 0.25), than he would donate nothing in the DG and offer 10c in the UG.
3. If the proposer has type (α, β) = (0, 0) and believes he is playing with a recipient of type (α, β) =
(2, 0.6), than he would donate nothing in the DG and offer 16c in the UG.
4. If the proposer has type (α, β) = (0, 0) and believes he is playing with a recipient of type (α, β) =
(4, 0.6), than he would donate nothing in the DG and offer 17.78c in the UG.
Proof. The first statement is trivial. As for the second one, the part concerning the DG is trivial. As for
the part concerning the UG, we first observe that since the proposer has type (0, 0) then he makes the
minimum offer such that the recipient accepts. Now, observe that rejecting an offer gives utility 0 to the
recipient, while accepting an offer gives utility negative only if that offer x is smaller than 10c, in which
case the recipient gets a utility of 2x−20 < 0. Thus, the proposer offers 10c and this completes the proof
of the second statement. The proof of the third and fourth statements are very much alike that of the
second statement. 
Experimental instructions
Here we report full experimental instructions of Treatment 1. Instructions of Treatment 2 were exactly
the same, apart from the order.
Screen 1.
This is the first part of the HIT. You have been paired with another, anonymous MTurk worker. Your
bonus will depend on your and his choices.
We give you a budget of 40 cents. Decide how much, if any, to offer to the other participant. At the
same time, he will decide his minimal acceptable offer.
If your offer is larger than or equal to his minimal acceptable offer, then he will get your offer and
you will keep the rest. Otherwise, if your offer is smaller than his minimal acceptable offer, both of you
get nothing.
The other person is real and will really make a decision.
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Screen 2.
Now we will ask you some comprehension questions to make sure you understand the game. You
MUST answer all questions CORRECTLY to receive the payment. In case you fail one of these questions,
you will immediately see the message ”We thank you for your time spent taking this survey. Your response
has been recorded”, and you will not receive any payment.
Screen 3.
Assume YOU offer 12 cents and the minimal acceptable offer of the OTHER PARTICIPANT is 10
cents. What is your bonus? (Here participants could choose between 0c, 10c, 12c, and 28c).
Screen 4.
Assume YOU offer 12 cents and the minimal acceptable offer of the OTHER PARTICIPANT is 10
cents. What is his bonus? (Here participants could choose between 0c, 10c, 12c, and 28c).
Screen 5.
Assume YOU offer 8 cents and the minimal acceptable offer of the OTHER PARTICIPANT is 14
cents. What is your bonus? (Here participants could choose between 0c, 8c, 14c, and 32c).
Screen 6.
Assume YOU offer 8 cents and the minimal acceptable offer of the OTHER PARTICIPANT is 14
cents. What is his bonus? (Here participants could choose between 0c, 8c, 14c, and 32c).
Screen 7.
Congratulations! You have passed the comprehension questions. Now, it’s time to make your decision.
WHAT IS YOUR OFFER? (Here participants could select every even amount of money between 0c
and 40).
Screen 8.
This is the second part of the HIT. Now, you have been paired with ANOTHER anonymous MTurker.
This time your bonus depends ONLY on your own choice: the other participant CANNOT influence your
bonus.
You are given a new budget of 30 cents and the other participant is given 10 cents. You have to
decide how much, if at all, to DONATE to the other participant. The other participant has no say and
will accept any donation.
Note that the decision is unilateral: nobody will have the choice to make a donation to you.
The other person is real and will really get your donation.
Screen 9.
Now we will ask you some comprehension questions to make sure you understand the game. You
MUST answer all questions CORRECTLY to receive the payment. In case you fail one of these questions,
you will immediately see the message ”We thank you for your time spent taking this survey. Your response
has been recorded”, and you will not receive any payment.
Screen 10.
If you donate 10 cents, what is YOUR bonus? (Here participants could choose between 30c, 20c, 10c,
and 0c).
Screen 11.
If you donate 10 cents, what is the OTHER PARCIPANT’s bonus? (Here participants could choose
between 30c, 20c, 10c, and 0c).
Screen 12.
If you donate 0 cents, what is YOUR bonus? (Here participants could choose between 30c, 20c, 10c,
and 0c).
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Screen 13.
If you donate 0 cents, what is THE OTHER PARTICIPANT’s bonus? (Here participants could choose
between 30c, 20c, 10c, and 0c).
Screen 14.
If you donate 12 cents, what is YOUR bonus? (Here participants chould choose between 22c, 18,c,
8c, and 12c).
Screen 15.
If you donate 12 cents, what is the OTHER PARTICIPANT’s bonus? (Here participants chould
choose between 22c, 18,c, 8c, and 12c).
Screen 16.
Congratulations! You have passed the comprehension questions. Now, it’s time to make your decision.
WHAT IS YOUR DONATION?
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